Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective

Abstract

Of the three major theories developed by post-World War 11 American social science to explain arms races, the repeated prisoner's dilemma, the spiral model, and the deterrence model, the deterrence model has received the least attention from game theorists. I present a model of this perspective and discuss its implications for arms racing and armscontrol theory. Arms races arise in the model when there is a conflict of interest between two states and uncertainty about the ability of at least one side to bear the strains of increased military spending. The model provides support for two common critiques of arms control. First, arms control is difficult to achieve when it is most needed, when there is a dispute accompanied by uncertainty that could lead to war. Second, arms races, though they occur in times of tension, do not necessarily increase the likelihood of war and may even reduce it by reducing uncertainty about relative power.