Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action, or Continuity?

Daniel Treisman

American Political Science Review · 2000 · 230 citations · 55 references

Concepts

TL;DR

The study investigates whether political and fiscal decentralization facilitates or impedes inflation control. Federal structures introduce additional veto players that can lock in prevailing monetary policy patterns. Across 87 countries, decentralization shows no overall effect on inflation levels, yet political decentralization dampens inflation volatility, slowing inflation growth in low‑inflation federations and speeding it in high‑inflation ones, implying that decentralization locks in central bank independence and budget constraints.

Abstract

Do political and fiscal decentralization make it easier or harder to control inflation? Statistical analysis of average annual inflation rates in a panel of 87 countries in the 1970s and 1980s found no clear relationship between decentralization and the level of inflation. Political decentralization, however, does appear to reduce change in countries' relative inflation rates over time. By creating additional veto players, federal structure may “lock in” existing patterns of monetary policy—whether inflationary or strict. Among the (mostly developed) countries that started with low inflation, inflation tended to increase more slowly in federations than in unitary states. Among the (mostly developing) countries that started with high inflation, inflation tended to increase faster in the federations. There is evidence that political decentralization locks in a country's degree of practical central bank independence—whether high or low—and the relative hardness or softness of budget constraints on subnational governments.

References

55