Amateur Legislators -- Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System

TLDR

The Argentine Congress has a limited role in public policy production and serves as an ineffective check on the executive branch. The authors argue that this weakness stems from incentives generated by multiple institutional features, especially electoral rules that delegate legislator selection to provincial governments or party bosses. These rules centralize election decisions, curtail legislators’ opportunities to pursue professional careers, and diminish their incentives to act independently.

Abstract

The Argentine Congress plays a limited role in the production of public policy and is a relatively ineffective check on the Argentine Executive Branch. We argue this is the combined result of incentives created by several features of Argentine political institutions. In this article we emphasize the role of the country's electoral rules, which place the legislator re? election decision not in the hands of the voters, but rather in the hands of the provincial govemor/party boss(es). These rules limit legislators' ability to develop a professional legis? lative career and reduce their incen?