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A Politico-Economic Theory of Income Redistribution
245
Citations
44
References
1985
Year
EconomicsPublic PolicyRedistributive SystemsPublic WelfareIncome RedistributionPolitical EconomyBusinessPovertyIncome DistributionFood StampsInternational RedistributionHuman WelfareSocial PolicyEconomic InequalityLisrel MethodPolitical ScienceSocial Sciences
This study integrates economists’ models of voluntary redistribution driven by interdependent preferences and the public‑good nature of redistribution with political scientists’ focus on conditions that generate state intervention demands and institutional development. The study proposes a testable theory of redistribution, applies it to data from American states, and posits links between the Aid to Families with Dependent Children guarantee and variables such as per‑capita income and liberal party control. The authors use LISREL to estimate parameters for observable indicators of latent constructs, analyze determinants of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children guarantee while adjusting for Medicaid and food stamps, and apply the theory to data from American states. The findings show that both political and economic variables significantly affect the level of the guarantee.
This study integrates models of income redistribution developed by economists, who suggest that citizens voluntarily redistribute because of interdependent preferences and rely on the state for implementation owing to the public-good nature of redistribution, and political scientists, who focus on conditions that lead to demands that the state intervene to assist the poor and on the development of institutions that facilitate such demands. We propose a testable theory of redistribution and apply it to data from the American states. The empirical analysis addresses determinants of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children guarantee, adjusted for Medicaid and food stamps to which a family receiving the guarantee would be entitled. We posit significant links between the guarantee and both observable explanatory variables, such as per-capita income, and latent constructs, such as liberal party control. We specify observable indicators for the latent constructs and use the LISREL method to estimate parameters for the indicators and structural coefficients. The findings show that both political and economic variables significantly affect the level of the guarantee.
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