Rural China takes off: institutional foundations of economic reform

TLDR

Chinese economic growth since the 1980s has been shaped by institutional reforms that redefined property rights, decentralized fiscal authority, and adapted local state corporatism to market production, creating a complex interplay between central regulation and local autonomy. The authors gathered data through semi‑structured interviews with a purposive sample, following a standardized procedure while acknowledging methodological limitations. Supplementary materials include illustrations, tables, acknowledgments, transliteration notes, a bibliography, and an index of changes in China’s fiscal system.

Abstract

List of Illustrations and Tables Acknowledgments Note on Measures and Transliteration 1. Institutional Foundations of Chinese Economic Growth: An Introduction State and Development A Problem of Agency Property Rights and Economic Growth Local State Corporatism Institutional Reform, Incentives, and Change Precis of the Study 2. Reassigning Property Rights over Revenue: Incentives for Rural Industrialization Dividing Property Rights Decollectivization and the Loss of Income Fiscal Reform and Rights to the Residual Credible Commitment From Limited Indirect Extractions to Direct Taxation Fiscal Incentives for Local Development 3. Strategies of Development: Variation and Evolution in Rural Industry Intervening Incentives The Character of Rural Industrial Growth in the 1980s The Logic of Collectively Owned Enterprise Development Management and Ownership in the 1990s Changing Ownership Forms in Rural Industry 4. Local State Corporatism: The Organization of Rapid Economic Growth Maoist Legacy as the Foundation The Local Corporate State Adapting Maoist Institutions to Market Production Adapting Local State Corporatism to Private Enterprise The Evolution of Local State-Led Development 5. Principals and Agents: Central Regulation or Local Control Overlapping Lines of Authority The Corporate Nature of Local Regulation Local Appropriation of Central Controls 6. From Agents to Principals: Increasing Resource Endowments and Local Control Regulation of Extra budgetary Funds Economic Retrenchment and a Test of Central Control The Erosion of Credit Controls Local Corporate Interests and Collusion Nonbank Sources of Capital The Limits of Central Control in a Changing Economic Context 7. The Political Basis for Economic Reform: Concluding Reflections The Security of Property Rights and Economic Growth The Political Consequences of Economic Reform Local State Corporatism and Central Control in a Transitional System Remaining Questions Appendix A. Research and Documentation The Interview Sample The Interview Procedure Limitations Appendix B. Changes in China's Fiscal System Bibliography Index