Project Value-Adding Optimization of Project-Based Supply Chain under Dynamic Reputation Incentives

Abstract

On the basis of equal cooperation between project-based enterprises, the project-based supply chain cross-organizational dynamic reputation incentives model was established in consideration of the implicit reputation factors to the contractor's incentive influence, and the impaction between control objective effect level, bargaining power and project value-adding was detailed analysed, especially the effective equilibrium condition for reputation incentive effects. Thus compared the analysis conclusions with project-based supply chain incentive model which single considering explicit benefit incentive, and verified the rationality and applicability of the project-based supply chain cross-organizational dynamic reputation incentives model through related digital simulation. The results reflects that, whether the linear relationship between duration and quality exists or not, the project management enterprise resorting to adjust project object objective incentive intensity and implementing reputation incentive strategy could not only achieve project value-adding maximization, but also realize net earnings Pareto improvement.