Temporal Parts Unmotivated

Abstract

In debate about the nature of persistence over time, the view that material objects endure has played the role of champion and the view that they perdure has played the role of challenger.' As in other contests, the champion's job is merely to defend her title, whereas the challenger's job is to prove herself worthy. I have no view about how these roles came to be assigned; but the historical fact is that perdurantists have traditionally borne the proverbial burden of proof in this debate. It has fallen to the perdurantists rather than the endurantists to motivate their view, to provide reasons for accepting it that override whatever initial presumption there is against it. Perdurantists have sought to discharge their burden in several ways. For example, perdurantism has been recommended on the grounds that: (i) it solves several of the puzzles that raise the problem of material constitution; (ii) it is (at least) suggested by the special theory of relativity (hereafter SR); (iii) it is the only view that makes sense out of the possibility of intrinsic change; (iv) it is the only view consistent with the doctrine of Humean supervenience; and (v) it makes better sense than its competitor out of the possibility of fission. These are the primary and most powerful claims that have been made on behalf of perdurantism.2 They are