Voluntary Corporate Disclosure: The Case of Interim Reporting

Richard Leftwich, Ross L. Watts, Jerold L. Zimmerman

Journal of Accounting Research · 1981 · 563 citations · 6 references

Concepts

TL;DR

In the absence of mandatory interim reporting, firms voluntarily publish interim reports, yet attempts to mandate such reporting face strong opposition, and existing literature focuses on normative prescriptions rather than the managers’ incentives to choose reporting frequency. This study examines the economic incentives that drive managers to voluntarily issue interim reports and to select specific reporting frequencies for external stakeholders.

Abstract

In the absence of mandatory interim reporting requirements, some firms voluntarily published interim reports. Attempts to mandate interim reporting encountered strong opposition from other firms. In this paper, we investigate the economic incentives of managers of corporations to provide interim reports voluntarily. In particular, we analyze why corporations choose a particular reporting frequency for external purposes. Our approach is in direct contrast to the predominantly normative thrust of much of the accounting literature dealing with interim reporting. Prescriptions concerning the desirable frequency of corporate reporting are common in that literature' and much attention is devoted to two related issues: (1) how frequently should corporations be required to report to their stockholders (i.e., semiannually, quarterly, or even monthly)? and (2) how should interim reports relate to annual reports? Little attention is given to the incentives of managers to choose a particular reporting frequency for external purposes.

References

6