Meinongian Theories and a Russellian Paradox

Abstract

This essay presents a re-examination of Alexius Meinong's article Uber Gegenstandstheorie (On the Theory of Objects) [26] and undertakes a clarification and revision of it which, I hope, is both faithful to Meinong and capable of overcoming the various objections to his theory that have appeared in the literature.1 I then turn to a discussion of a historically and technically interesting Russell-style paradox that arises in the modified theory. I also examine the alternative Meinonginspired theories of Hector-Neri Castafieda and Terence Parsons, using the modified theory as a sharper tool for investigating their worth than that provided by unaided intuitions or comprehensive, ad-hoc theory fragments. As with all theories, many of my claims are not susceptible of proof but, rather, gain their plausibility and value from their ability to deal with data and to provide solutions to various problems. The two main problems which, I believe, a properly constructed Meinongian theory ought to be capable of handling are, first, a linguistic problem of long-standing philosophical concern: that of providing a foundation for a semantics of natural languages, and, second, the problem of intentionality and the analysis of the structure of psychological discourse. Even Quine, ordinarily no friend of intentional language, attests to the importance of the latter problem, considering such discourse to be less clearly dispensable than other modalities ([36]: 336). For this problem, the theory must embody a characterization of the objects of thought (in the sense of that which is thought about). In order to account for the psychological phenomenon illustrated by puzzles concerning objects