Political Control and Policy Impact in EPA's Office of Water Quality

Abstract

Theory: The theory of overhead democracy is supplemented with theoretical insights from public administration to produce a more complete picture of bureaucratic decision making. Hypotheses: Efforts at political control are less successful in altering agency goals, values, and the general direction of public policy than they are at altering bureaucratic outputs. Changes in bureaucratic activity over time depend upon external efforts at political control, agency resources, and the complexity and salience of the policy area. Methods: A series of multivariate transfer-function models is used to account for changes in EPA enforcement activity, total federal enforcement activity, and the expression of agency values in water-pollution control. Results: Executive and legislative efforts at political control did reduce enforcement activity. However, these efforts were ineffective at altering agency values, less effective at EPA than in most other agencies, and less effective in waterpollution control than in other areas of EPA enforcement. They also mobilized EPA clientele to produce lower levels of political control in the long run.