Perspectives in Science · 2015 · 20 citations · 23 references
BusinessCorporate GovernanceFinanceAgency TheoryCorporate FinanceFamily BusinessAgency CostsFamily Business ManagementFamily Business PerformanceFamily ControlFamily Firm GovernanceFamily OwnershipAgency In Family FirmsExtended Family InvolvementFamily Agency CostsFamily Business OwnershipFamily Firm Control StructuresFamily Involvement In GovernanceFamily Involvement In Management
This study examines the agency costs of 314 family firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China. The results show that agency costs of family firms increase significantly with the enhancement of family's ownership and the separation of ownership and control, while family involvement in management can reduce the agency costs. By including the variable proxying internal control and the interaction term between internal control and family involvement in the empirical model, we still find that the effects of family involvement on agency costs are contingent on the quality of internal control.
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Separation of Ownership and Control
Eugene F. Fama, Michael C. Jensen · The Journal of Law and Economics · 1983 · 19.1K citations
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Michael C. Jensen · American Economic Review · 1986 · 17.6K citations
Agency Problems and Residual Claims
Eugene F. Fama, Michael C. Jensen · The Journal of Law and Economics · 1983 · 4.9K citations