European Law Review · 2013 · 92 citations · 0 references
Social SciencesPublic GovernancePublic PolicyFiscal PolicyIntergovernmental Fiscal RelationsRulemakingEconomic GovernanceEuropean EconomicsEuropean GovernanceEuropean IntegrationEuropean PoliticsEuropean Public PolicyEuropean Union Economic PolicyEuropean Union Policy-makingFiscal Discipline RulesPolicy CoordinationPolicy Coordination MechanismsPolicy Coordination Roles
The EU has adopted two legislative packages aimed at strengthening economic governance by tightening fiscal discipline and reforming domestic fiscal frameworks. This article proposes an alternative reading of these reforms, arguing that rules‑based governance is not exclusive, not zero‑sum, and that it interacts with coordination mechanisms to form a hybrid architecture. The authors analyze reforms to domestic fiscal frameworks to substantiate these claims. They find that rules‑based governance is pluralized beyond the Community method, that coordination mechanisms such as the European semester are intensively used, and that the two forms of governance interact to create a hybrid architecture.
The Union has recently adopted two packages of legislative measures with a view to strengthening EU economic governance. In particular, attempts have been made to tighten fiscal discipline and to secure reforms to domestic fiscal frameworks. Rhetorically, these reforms have been framed by the explicit or implicit juxtaposition of, on the one hand, a return or revival of rules-based governance through the so-called method, and on the other, the alleged failures or weaknesses of economic governance through policy coordination under the open This article suggests an alternative reading of the reforms based on three connected claims. The first is that rules-based governance itself is not monopolised by the legislative activity associated with the Community method. Indeed, there is a pluralisation in the sources and sites of normativity, with extra-EU legal solutions also being sought. The second claim is that rules-based and co-ordination-based forms of EU governance are not locked into a zero-sum relationship in which whatever is gained by one is lost by the other. Indeed, the technique of policy co-ordination - exemplified by mechanisms of reporting and monitoring - has been diffused and intensified in the packages of reforms, with the European semester emerging as the key framework for the co-ordination of coordination. The third claim is that rules-based and co-ordination-based forms of governance do not merely co-exist but interact in ways that produce a hybrid governance architecture. Through an exploration of reforms to domestic fiscal frameworks, these claims are advanced and evidenced.