Philosophy of Science · 2012 · 39 citations · 16 references
Life SciencesBiologyNeuroscienceMolecular NeuroscienceMolecular PhysiologyNeurophysiologyExplanationNeuroethologyCausal Explanation In BiologyMechanistic CausationMechanistic ExplanationMechanistic HypothesesMechanistic InterpretationMechanistic ReasoningNature Of Scientific Explanations
Many explanations in molecular biology, neuroscience, and other fields of experimental biology describe mechanisms underlying phenomena of interest. These mechanistic explanations (MEx) account for higher-level phenomena in terms of causally active parts and their spatiotemporal organization. What makes such a mechanistic description explanatory? The best-developed answer, Craver's causal-mechanical account, has several weaknesses. It does not fully explicate the target of explanation, interlevel relation, or interactive nonmodular character of many biological mechanisms as we understand them. An alternative account of MEx, emphasizing interdependence among a mechanism's components (‘jointness’), remedies these difficulties.
16
Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation
Choice Reviews Online · 2004 · 3.4K citations
Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, Carl F. Craver · Philosophy of Science · 2000 · 3.1K citations
Philip Kitcher · Philosophy of Science · 1981 · 1.1K citations · Full text
Mechanisms and the nature of causation
StuartS. Glennan · Erkenntnis · 1996 · 877 citations