2000 · 10 citations · 2 references
ComputingComputer ScienceCybersecurityAuditingComputer SecurityNetwork SecurityData AnonymizationData De-identificationData SecurityIdentity ManagementIntrusion DetectionSecurity AuditingAnonymizationAnonymization RequirementsDe-anonymizationIdentity RecoveryPseudonymityPseudonymizationPseudonymous IdentityTrust Models
In multilaterally secure intrusion detection systems, anonymity and accountability conflict, and prior work on trust models has been reviewed. The study proposes threshold‑based pseudonymization of audit data to reconcile anonymity and accountability in IDS, binding reidentification to a legal threshold and contrasting this approach with prior methods while highlighting open issues. A threshold‑based reversible pseudonymization scheme is introduced that ties reidentification to a legal threshold, avoiding external mechanisms and enabling accountability upon policy violations.
In multilaterally secure intrusion detection systems (IDS) anonymity and accountability are potentially conflicting requirements. Since IDS rely on audit data to detect violations of security policy, we can balance above requirements by pseudonymization of audit data, as a form of reversible anonymization. We discuss previous work in this area and underlying trust models. Instead of relying on mechanisms external to the system, or under the control of potential adversaries, in our proposal we technically bind reidentification to a threshold, representing the legal purpose of accountability in the presence of policy violations. Also, we contrast our notion of threshold-based identity recovery with previous approaches and point out open problems.
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