Eudaimonia and Self-sufficiency in the Nicomachean Ethics

Abstract

There is a well known difficulty in understanding Aristotle's answer to central question of Nicomachean Ethics:' what is eudaimonia? Some, leaning on Bk. X, chapters 6-8, maintain that Aristotle's answer is contemplation to exclusion of anything else. Others, leaning on Bk. I, hold that eudaimonia includes other goods besides contemplation, especially (what I will call) moral action, exercise of moral virtues. Still others hold that Bk. X contains an exclusive of eudaimonia as consisting in nothing but contemplation, and is not in end reconcilable with Bk. I's inclusive account. At present, a consensus seems to be growing that at least we can be sure that Bk. I propounds an inclusive account of eudaimonia.2 Hence, if Bks. I and X fit together into a coherent account, Bk. X must be brought into line with such a position. I'll call this the comprehensive view of eudaimonia. The comprehensive interpretation relies on a number of arguments to support its of NE I, above all criterion of self-sufficiency laid down at 1097bl4-21. In present paper I will argue that appeal to selfsufficiency as well as other arguments fail to prove comprehensive