The Paradox of Representation

TLDR

Conventional wisdom holds that more legislative representation is always better, but the authors argue that, all else equal, fewer representatives can sometimes be preferable. The study demonstrates that a paradoxical effect—where fewer representatives can be preferable—arises across naive, sophisticated, and cooperative voting systems, undermining assumptions in electoral‑system research, explaining mismatches between public opinion and policy, and challenging classical theories such as pluralism and Marxism, thereby showing that fair representation is not a prerequisite for justice.

Abstract

It has long been taken for granted that legislative representation is an asset, something of which more is always better than less, all else equal. No, sometimes less is better than more though all else be equal. This paradox can occur under naive, sophisticated, and cooperative voting. From a model of distributive politics I deduce that a strong version must occur in all but special cases. The paradox refutes an assumption of many electoral-system studies, offers a new explanation of discrepancies between public opinion and public policy, challenges classical approaches to political analysis, including pluralism and Marxism, and shows that "fair representation" is not a requirement of justice.