Mathematics of Operations Research · 2005 · 563 citations · 17 references
Natural SciencesDecision SciencesMathematicsDecision TheoryOptimizationProbability TheoryDynamic ProgrammingOptimal ControlStochastic ControlStochastic GamesStochastic OptimizationStochastic ProgrammingDiscrete-time Dynamic ProgrammingFinite Horizon Dynamic ProgrammingFinite-horizon Stochastic GamesInfinite Horizon Dynamic ProgrammingInfinite Horizon GamesStochastic Dynamic ProgrammingTransition ProbabilitiesZero-sum Stochastic Games
The paper proposes a robust formulation of discrete‑time dynamic programming to reduce the sensitivity of optimal policies to uncertainty in transition probabilities. Ambiguity is represented by assigning a set of conditional probability measures to each state–action pair, and the robust policy is derived by solving for the optimal policy over these sets, using rectangularity and construction techniques from Nilim and El Ghaoui to enable efficient computation. When the measure sets satisfy a rectangularity property, all standard finite‑ and infinite‑horizon DP results carry over, and robust DP is shown to be equivalent to stochastic zero‑sum games with perfect information.
In this paper we propose a robust formulation for discrete time dynamic programming (DP). The objective of the robust formulation is to systematically mitigate the sensitivity of the DP optimal policy to ambiguity in the underlying transition probabilities. The ambiguity is modeled by associating a set of conditional measures with each state-action pair. Consequently, in the robust formulation each policy has a set of measures associated with it. We prove that when this set of measures has a certain “rectangularity” property, all of the main results for finite and infinite horizon DP extend to natural robust counterparts. We discuss techniques from Nilim and El Ghaoui [17] for constructing suitable sets of conditional measures that allow one to efficiently solve for the optimal robust policy. We also show that robust DP is equivalent to stochastic zero-sum games with perfect information.
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