The legitimacy of judicial review: The limits of dialogue between courts and legislatures

Luc Tremblay

International Journal of Constitutional Law · 2005 · 110 citations · 0 references

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TL;DR

The theory of institutional dialogue posits that courts and legislatures engage in a dialogue to balance constitutional principles and public policy, thereby justifying judicial review as legitimate. The essay argues that institutional dialogue has limits in legitimizing judicial review. The author analyzes institutional dialogue by contrasting dialogue as deliberation versus dialogue as conversation within the democratic legitimacy debate. The study concludes that while some dialogue exists, the type required to legitimize judicial review is absent, rendering institutional dialogue theory ultimately rhetorical.

Abstract

According to the theory of "institutional dialogue," courts and legislatures participate in a dialogue aimed at achieving the proper balance between constitutional principles and public policies and the existence of this dialogue constitutes a good reason for not conceiving of judicial review as democratically illegitimate. This essay sets out to demonstrate that there are important limits to the capacity of insitutional dialogue to legitimize the institution of judicial review. To that end, it situates the theory of institutional dialogue within the debate over the legitimacy of judicial review of legislation within democracy and introduces a distinction between two conceptions of dialogue—dialogue as deliberation and dialogue as conversation—and examines the limits of each theory. The author does not contend that there can be no dialogue between courts and legislatures but, rather, that the kind of dialogue that would be needed to confer legitimacy on the institution and practice of judicial review does not—and cannot—exist. Consequently, the normative character of institutional dialogue theory, as conceived thus far, is ultimately rhetorical.