International Studies Quarterly · 2010 · 24 citations · 45 references
Social SciencesEconomicsPolitical ScienceEconomic PolicyInternational Political EconomyPolitical EconomyAfrican PoliticsDomestic PoliticsForeign AidForeign PolicyForeign Policy Decision-makingInternational AidForeign Aid FlowsForeign Policy BehaviorPartisan PoliticsParty Control Of AppropriationsPolitical Economy Of AidPresidential Foreign PolicyUnited States Foreign Policy
US foreign aid is commonly assumed to be rationally driven by external stimuli such as security, economic interests, or humanitarian needs, yet two‑level game logic shows it can be trapped by domestic partisan politics. The study explores an alternative conceptualization of foreign assistance policy by building an interactive model that links external stimuli and domestic partisan differences to explain US aid to Africa from 1982 to 2003. An interactive model couples external stimuli and domestic partisan differences to explain US aid to Africa during 1982‑2003. Shifts in party control of the Presidency and Congress alter how much weight is given to external factors in economic assistance policy, fundamentally reassessing explanations of foreign aid and foreign policy.
This article is designed to explore the usefulness of an alternative conceptualization of the foreign assistance policy process. The common assumption is that US foreign aid outputs are rationally determined in response to external stimuli such as US security or economic interests or human need in a country. Yet, consistent with the logic of two-level games, foreign aid policy can become ensnared in domestic politics, especially those of a partisan distinction. In this article, I build an interactive model of foreign policy where external stimuli and domestic partisan differences are coupled to explain foreign assistance behavior toward Africa over the fiscal 1982–2003 period. I find that shifts in party control of the Presidency and the Congress lead to different valuations of the importance of external factors in making economic assistance policy. This interaction of domestic and foreign inputs serves to offer a fundamental reassessment of explanations concerning foreign assistance policy specifically, and foreign policy generally.
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Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy
Douglas A. Hibbs · American Political Science Review · 1977 · 2.6K citations