The Poverty of Popperian Epidemiology

Abstract

Karl Popper is one of the leading scientific philosophers of this century and his death marks the end of an era in philosophy which started with the publication of the Logic of Scientific Discovery in 1934 and went on until 1992 when he published a last collection of essays. He created an intellectual tidal wave in the philosophy of science by his bold claim that falsifiable hypotheses were the essence of scientific discovery. Yet, philosophy evolves and maybe progresses, and the two generations of philosophers who succeeded him have mostly been critical of many of his positions, while acknowledging and respecting his insights. The present paper does not intend to discuss Popper's philosophy, although for the sake of clarity, it will be necessary to make some incidental critical remarks. What is at stake is rather a movement of ideas which spread in the epidemiological literature and which became known as Popperian epidemiology. There have been several epidemiological critiques of Popperian epidemiology. However, Popperian epidemiology is primarily a set of philosophical claims which call forth a philosophical critique. Popperian epidemiology is understood as the common core of claims propounded by a group of selfchristened Popperian epidemiologists, which sets them apart from the mainstream of epidemiological thinking. These basic tenets include: 1. An allegiance to Karl Popper. 2. The claim that science is based on the negative version of the hypothetico-deductive method, the method of conjectures and refutations. 3. The denial of the validity of induction.