Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game

TLDR

Spatial models of electoral competition often ignore internal constituency politics and the stability of divergent electoral coalitions has rarely been addressed. The study explicitly incorporates differential group support rates within constituencies to examine how they shape campaign promises and the formation of stable electoral coalitions. They draw on urban services literature to support propositions about how differential group support rates influence campaign promises and coalition stability. They argue that risk‑averse candidates optimally promise redistributions first to their reelection constituency, thereby maintaining existing political coalitions.

Abstract

Spatial models of electoral competition typically simplify the analysis by ignoring the question of internal constituency politics: constituencies are modeled simply as a distribution of ideal points along a set of issue dimensions. Matters related to the stability of divergent electoral coalitions have rarely been addressed. We explicitly take into account how differential rates of support by various groups in a constituency will influence candidates' campaign promises and the likelihood that stable electoral coalitions will be forged. Viewing campaign platforms as promised redistributions of welfare, we argue that the optimal strategy for risk-averse candidates will be to promise redistributions first and foremost to their reelection constituency and thereby to maintain existing political coalitions. We use evidence from the urban services literature to support our propositions.