2002 · 119 citations · 7 references
ComputingComputer ScienceMathematicsComputer SecurityCryptographySecurity ProtocolsCryptographic Protocol DesignCryptographic ProtocolsProtocol AnalysisProtocol VerificationSecurity Protocol VerificationCorrectness ProofsCryptographic Protocol AnalysisFormal Methods For Security ProtocolsFormal Verification Of Cryptographic ProtocolsProtocol CompositionProtocol Formal VerificationProtocol Security ProofsSecurity Properties Of Protocols
In security protocol analysis, it is important to learn general principles that limit the abilities of an attacker and that can be applied repeatedly to a variety of protocols. The authors introduce the notion of an ideal-a set of messages closed under encryption and invariant under composition with arbitrary messages-to express such principles. In conjunction with the strand space formalism, they use the concept of ideals to prove bounds on a penetrator's capabilities, independent of the security protocol being analyzed. From this they prove a number of correctness properties of the Otway Rees protocol, using these results to explain the limitations of the protocol.
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Michael T. Burrows, Martı́n Abadi, Roger M. Needham · ACM Transactions on Computer Systems · 1990 · 2.5K citations · Full text
Michael T. Burrows, M. Abadi, R. Needham · 1989 · 643 citations
Proving properties of security protocols by induction
Lawrence C. Paulson · 2002 · 255 citations
Towards formal analysis of security protocols
W. Mao, Colin Boyd · 2002 · 126 citations