The Economics of Roscas and Intrahousehold Resource Allocation

Susan Anderson, Jean‐Marie Baland

The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2002 · 601 citations · 29 references

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Concepts

TL;DR

The study investigates why individuals join roscas, proposing that household conflict drives participation. The authors model rosca participation as a wife’s strategy to shield savings from her husband’s consumption claims and test this with Kenyan data. Evidence from Nairobi shows most roscas are mainly women, especially married women with independent income.

Abstract

This paper investigates individual motives to participate in rotating savings and credit associations (roscas). Detailed evidence from roscas in a Kenyan slum (Nairobi) suggests that most roscas are predominantly composed of women, particularly those living in a couple and earning an independent income. We propose an explanation of this based on conflictual interactions within the household. Participation in a rosea is a strategy a wife employs to protect her savings against claims by her husband for immediate consumption. The empirical implications of the model are then tested using the data collected in Kenya.

References

29