The Determinants of Nuclear Force Structure

Erik Gartzke, Jeffrey M. Kaplow, Rupal N. Mehta

Journal of Conflict Resolution · 2013 · 65 citations · 54 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Existing research on nuclear proliferation has largely ignored why states choose specific nuclear force portfolios after acquiring basic nuclear capability. The study proposes a portfolio theory that states pursue diverse deterrent capabilities while constrained by resources and organization. Using a new dataset of nine nuclear nations’ weapon platforms from 1950–2000, the authors examine how resource availability, experience, bureaucratic politics, conventional threat, rival presence, and alliances shape force structure. The results advance understanding of post‑acquisition nuclear behavior, highlighting the key drivers of force portfolio decisions.

Abstract

A substantial literature examines the causes of nuclear proliferation, but few studies have addressed why states decide on a particular portfolio of weapon systems once they have acquired a basic nuclear capability. We advance a portfolio theory of nuclear force structure, positing that states seek a diverse set of capabilities for nuclear deterrence, but that they also face major resource and organizational constraints. A number of factors may help to explain the portfolio of nuclear forces that states ultimately field, including resource availability, experience as a nuclear power, bureaucratic politics, the conventional threat environment, the presence of nuclear rivals, and the maintenance of nuclear alliances. We test the influence of these factors on force structure using a new data set of nuclear weapon platforms fielded by nine nuclear nations between 1950 and 2000. Our findings represent an important step in understanding the drivers of nuclear behavior after states have joined the nuclear weapons club.

References

54