Grounded Theory Methodology

TLDR

Grounded theory research has long been divided over procedural details and epistemological foundations, with Strauss and Corbin favoring Dewey‑inspired instrumentalism and hypothetico‑deductivism, while Glaser insists on a purely inductive approach. This article argues that the split arises from conflicting justifications and that neither instrumentalism nor induction alone adequately supports the method. The author proposes a new justification framework—methodological hermeneutics—built on Margolis’s synthesis of realism and relativism. Applying this framework shows that Glaser’s inductive procedures best align with grounded theory’s aims.

Abstract

The originators of the grounded theory approach to qualitative research now disagree on certain procedural aspects of the methodology, while agreeing on others, and dispute its epistemological implications. In this article it is argued that the rift can be traced to a conflict over the logic of justification of the approach. Strauss and Corbin endorse Dewey's instrumentalism, including its prizing of the experimental method, and introduce a form of hypothetico-deductivism into the grounded theory method. Alternatively, although subscribing tacitly to the experimental method, Glaser does not tie it in with instrumentalism, and insists that grounded theory properly involves only the inductive phase of inquiry. It is argued that both instrumentalism and induction are inadequate as rationales for the grounded theory method. A new logic of justification, termed methodological hermeneutics and derived from Margolis's reconciliation of realism and relativism, has been developed by the author. When applied to the two positions, it leads to the conclusion that Glaser's procedures are the most consistent with the objectives of the method.