Disputatio · 2007 · 131 citations · 6 references
HumanitiesPhilosophyEthicsMoral DevelopmentMoral PsychologyBounded RationalityMoral ReasoningRational ChoiceReasoned Decision-makingEpistemic RationalityInstrumental RationalityNormative ReasoningNormative ReasonsPractical Rationality
Rationality demands consistency of beliefs and alignment of intentions, raising the question of whether it itself provides reasons for action. The author examines two accounts of rationality: an instrumental norm that aids goal attainment and a responsive norm that aligns with reasons. The study concludes skeptically that neither account provides a satisfactory answer, rejecting both.
Abstract Rationality requires various things of you. For example, it requires you not to have contradictory beliefs, and to intend what you believe is a necessary means to an end that you intend. Suppose rationality requires you to F. Does this fact constitute a reason for you to F? Does it even follow from this fact that you have a reason to F? I examine these questions and reach a sceptical conclusion about them. I can find no satisfactory argument to show that either has the answer ‘yes’. I consider the idea that rationality is normative for instrumental reasons, because it helps you to achieve some of the things you ought to achieve. I also consider the idea that rationality consists in responding correctly to reasons. I reject both.
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Niko Kolodny · Mind · 2005 · 660 citations
Does Rationality Give Us Reasons?<sup>1</sup>
John Broome · Philosophical Issues · 2005 · 166 citations
John Broome · Mind · 2007 · 133 citations