Publication | Closed Access
An‐<i>arrgh</i>‐chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization
350
Citations
45
References
2007
Year
Pirates required mechanisms to prevent internal predation, minimize crew conflict, and maximize piratical profit. This article investigates the internal governance institutions of violent criminal enterprise by examining the law, economics, and organization of pirates. The study analyzes pirates’ use of checks and balances to constrain captain predation and democratic constitutions to minimize conflict and establish law and order. Pirates devised checks and balances and democratic constitutions, creating sufficient order and cooperation to make them one of the most sophisticated and successful criminal organizations in history.
This article investigates the internal governance institutions of violent criminal enterprise by examining the law, economics, and organization of pirates. To effectively organize their banditry, pirates required mechanisms to prevent internal predation, minimize crew conflict, and maximize piratical profit. Pirates devised two institutions for this purpose. First, I analyze the system of piratical checks and balances crews used to constrain captain predation. Second, I examine how pirates used democratic constitutions to minimize conflict and create piratical law and order. Pirate governance created sufficient order and cooperation to make pirates one of the most sophisticated and successful criminal organizations in history.
| Year | Citations | |
|---|---|---|
Page 1
Page 1