Economic Theory · 2008 · 82 citations · 13 references
Social SciencesBusiness EconomicsEconomicsDecision TheoryGame TheoryMicroeconomicsBehavioral Game TheoryGame Theory In CompetitionInvestmentContest SuccessContest TheoryGame Theoretic ReasoningGame-theoretic Decision ModelsGame-theoretic Multi-agent SystemsWinner-take-all Markets
The key element of models of contest is the contest success function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizations to the case where each agent can have multiple types of investments. This allows us to provide a unified framework to extend and interpret the results of Skaperdas (Econ Theory 7:283–290, 1996) and Clark and Riis (Econ Theory 11:201–204, 1998), and rationalize some seemingly ad hoc CSFs used by applied researchers.
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Lectures on Functional Equations and their Applications.
F. Hahn, J. Aczél, Hansjörg Oser · American Mathematical Monthly · 1968 · 2.6K citations
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Modelling rent-seeking contests
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