IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility · 2012 · 75 citations · 8 references
EngineeringComputer EngineeringElectrical EngineeringCryptographyElectromagneticsElectromagnetismCryptographic ArchitectureElectromagnetic CompatibilityElectromagnetic PowerSide-channel AnalysisSide-channel AttacksElectromagnetic AnalysisElectromagnetic InterferenceElectromagnetic Side-channel AttacksInformation LeakagePower ConsumptionPower Consumption ModelingSide-channel Leakage Assessment
This paper presents a novel analysis of electromagnetic (EM) information leakage from cryptographic devices, based on the electromagnetic interference (EMI) theory. In recent years, side-channel attack using side-channel information (e.g., power consumption and EM radiation) is of major concern for designers of cryptographic devices. However, few studies have been conducted to investigate how EM information leakage changes according to device's physical parameters. In this paper, we introduce a cryptographic device model to analyze EM information leakage based on the EMI theory in a systematic manner. This device model makes it possible to acquire the frequency characteristics of EM radiation depending on physical parameters, such as board size and power-line length, accurately. The analysis results show that EM information leakage can be explained by the major EMI parameters such as board size and cable length attached to the board. In addition, we demonstrate that the intensity of EM information leakage from a generic device is also explained by board size and cable length.
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D.M. Hockanson, James L. Drewniak, T.H. Hubing et al. · IEEE Transactions on Electromagnetic Compatibility · 1996 · 274 citations
Engineering, Electrical Engineering, Computational Electromagnetics +7
Tetsushi Watanabe, Osami Wada, Takuya Miyashita et al. · IEICE Transactions on Communications · 2000 · 88 citations