The Journal of Finance · 1994 · 130 citations · 23 references
BusinessFinanceBankruptcy LawCorporate FinanceFinancial EconomicsBankruptcyBankruptcy RiskFinancial DistressFinancial RiskInvestment ProtectionInvestment ScreeningBankruptcy InstitutionsBankruptcy ProtectionBankruptcy Risk ManagementChapter 11 Investing
ABSTRACT Asymmetric information and conflicts of interest between equity and debt holders can force a distressed but efficient firm to liquidate and may enable a distressed inefficient firm to continue. In the extreme, if it is costless for an inefficient firm to mimic an efficient firm in a debt restructuring, efficient and inefficient firms are equally likely to continue or liquidate. This article shows that Chapter 11 procedures impose costs on inefficient firms that would otherwise mimic efficient firms. This separation induces voluntary filing for bankruptcy by inefficient firms and consequently enables efficient firms to continue when they would otherwise be liquidated.
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Stuart C. Gilson, Kose John, Larry H.P. Lang · Journal of Financial Economics · 1990 · 1.1K citations
Lawrence A. Weiss · Journal of Financial Economics · 1990 · 724 citations
A Theory of Workouts and the Effects of Reorganization Law*
Robert Gertner, David Scharfstein · The Journal of Finance · 1991 · 630 citations
Management, Finance, Public Finance +17