The common property issue in flood control through land use in <scp>F</scp>rance

Abstract

Abstract Through the example of F rench flood‐control policy, this paper illustrates the general change taking place in the relation of societies and governments to risk. Former policies based on structural measures to reduce the a lea were found excessively expensive, but liberal approaches based on insurance mechanisms were not suited to face extreme events. Better solutions depend on the re‐appraisal of water as a common property and the design of corresponding institutions. In F rance, these could have been the a gences de l'eau , which are now in charge of implementing the W ater F ramework D irective. But back in 1966, central government refused to involve them in flood control, keeping the latter in its own realm. After 1983, successive G overnments preferred to develop c at'nat’ , a solidarity scheme based on taxes added on insurance premiums, and on local risk protection plans ( PPR‐i ) constraining land use rights. This system's benefits and shortcomings are discussed, including the discrepancies between national post‐disaster solidarity and local pre‐disaster vulnerability reduction; it lastly shows recent evolutions towards catchment‐based approaches in complex multi‐level governance, in which the hydrographic district level, adopted to synthesise the f lood r isk m anagement p lans ( FRMPs ), is supplemented by catchment programmes on flood risks called PAPI . Implementing the FRMPs in F rance illustrates the need for economic incentives and common‐pool institutions in multi‐level governance.