The Journal of Economic Perspectives · 2010 · 306 citations · 30 references
BusinessEconomicsFinanceAsset PricingFinancial EconomicsFinancial MarketsCapital MarketsFinancial CrisesFinancial DistressLiquidityLiquidity RiskMarket LiquidityCounterparty RiskCounterparty Risk CapitalDebt Feedback EffectsFinancial Market FragilityMortgage Market LiquidityRisk Capital
The 2007 financial crisis exposed a breakdown in debt markets, where asset values could diverge from market prices during periods of limited liquidity, underscoring the need to examine the underlying market plumbing. This article aims to illustrate how debt market malfunctions can harm the real economy by detailing the mechanisms behind such failures. By reviewing risk capital, repo financing, and counterparty risk, the paper shows how rising liquidity premiums and feedback loops can trigger a contagious spiral, leading to market breakdowns and prompting targeted Federal Reserve interventions.
The financial crisis that began in 2007 is especially a crisis in debt markets. A full understanding of what happened in the financial crisis requires investigation into the plumbing of debt markets. During a financial crisis, when funds often cannot be raised easily or quickly, the fundamental values for certain assets can become separated for a time from market prices, with consequences that can echo into the real economy. This article will explain in concrete ways how debt markets can malfunction, with deleterious consequences for the real economy. After a quick overview of debt markets, I discuss three areas that are crucial in all debt markets decisions: risk capital and risk aversion; repo financing and haircuts; and counterparty risk. In each of these areas, feedback effects can arise so that less liquidity and a higher cost for finance can reinforce each other in a contagious spiral. I will document the remarkable rise in the premium that investors placed on liquidity during the crisis. Next, I will show how these issues caused debt markets to break down; indeed, fundamental values and market values seemed to diverge across several markets and products that were far removed from the “toxic” subprime mortgage assets at the root of the crisis. Finally, I will discuss briefly four steps that the Federal Reserve took to ease the crisis and how each was geared to a specific systemic fault that arose during the crisis.
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