Journal of Political Economy · 1995 · 707 citations · 28 references
Social SciencesInternational RelationsPolitical ScienceInternational EconomicsInternational Political EconomyPolitical EconomyDomestic PoliticsInternational CooperationTrade PoliticsDomestic Politics Of TradeInternational Economic CooperationMultilateral Trade RelationsTrade Wars
International trade actions are shaped by domestic politics, yet prior research has treated governments as politically neutral and purely public‑interest driven. The study aims to incorporate domestic political considerations into models of international trade. The authors model leaders balancing welfare provision for voters with fundraising from special interests. The results identify key factors shaping protectionist policy structures under both cooperative and noncooperative equilibrium conditions.
When governments meet in the international arena, their actions reflect the political situations at home. Previous studies of trade relations have focused on governments that are immune from political pressures and that act as benevolent servants of the public interest. Here we introduce domestic politics into the analysis of international economic relations. We study the interactions between national leaders who are concerned with both providing a high standard of living to the general electorate and collecting campaign contributions from special-interest groups. Our analysis sheds light on the determinants of the structure of protection in noncooperative and cooperative policy equilibria.
28