International Economic Review · 2000 · 154 citations · 25 references
Social SciencesCriminologyEconomicsPolicingPolitical EconomyPublic EconomicsCrime PolicyCriminal JusticeIncome DistributionIncome RedistributionCrime InequalityMajority VotingMajority Voting SystemsPolicing IncentivesRedistribution PoliticsRedistribution PreferencesSocioeconomic Determinants Of Crime
This article analyzes a general equilibrium model in which agents choose to specialize in either legitimate or criminal activities. Expenditures on police to apprehend criminals, as well as income redistribution, are determined endogenously through majority voting. We investigate how crime, redistribution, and police expenditures depend on characteristics of the underlying distribution of income‐earning abilities and on the apprehension technology. Our model accounts for the positive correlation between inequality and crime, the positive correlation between expenditures on police and redistribution, and the lack of correlation between crime and redistribution observed in U.S. data.
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