PHY-Authentication Protocol for Spoofing Detection in Wireless Networks

Abstract

We propose a PHY-authentication protocol to detect spoofing attacks in wireless networks, exploiting the rapid-decorrelation property of radio channels with distance. In this protocol, a PHY-authentication scheme that exploits channel estimations that already exist in most wireless systems, cooperates with any existing-either simple or advanced-higher-layer process, such as IEEE 802.11i. With little additional system overhead, our scheme reduces the workload of the higher-layer process, or provides some degree of spoofing protection for ``naked" wireless systems, such as some sensor networks. We describe the performance of our approach as a function of the spoofing pattern and the snapshot performance that can be easily measured through field tests. We discuss the implementation issues of the authentication protocol on 802.11 testbeds and verify its performance via field tests in a typical office building.