The UN Anti-terror Sanctions Regime under Pressure

Abstract

The plague of international terrorism has not only resulted in a ripple effect on national legislative activity, particularly in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, but it has also led to wide consensus within the international community to adopt a prompt and effective response to counter the financing of terrorism. In its fight against terrorism, the United Nations Security Council (SC) has resorted to the same strategy inaugurated in 1997 (and supplemented in 1998) with the introduction of travel and financial restrictions against members of the UNITA1. Targeting individuals, rather than a specific State, marked a qualitative change in the SC's sanctions policy. These so-called ‘targeted sanctions’, also known as ‘smart sanctions’, have been introduced in a number of SC resolutions directed against individuals and entities allegedly associated with the Taliban and Al-Qaida. By means of Resolution 1267,2 the SC, inter alia, required States to freeze funds and financial assets controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban; likewise, Resolution 13333 ordered as much with regard to Osama bin Laden and his associates. To these resolutions, blacklists were attached for listing the targeted individuals and corporate entities. Resolution 13904 renewed the Taliban/Al-Qaida blacklists and expanded the reach of the sanctions to any person associated with the Taliban, Osama bin Laden or Al-Qaida, imposing on the latter a travel ban and arms embargo. It was the first resolution which dispensed with any link to a specific territory or State.5 The Resolutions setting out the targeted sanctions regime are binding on all United Nations (UN) Member States because they were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.