Board of Director Composition, Shareholder Wealth, and Dividend Policy

Michael Schellenger, David D. Wood, Ahmad Tashakori

Journal of Management · 1989 · 255 citations · 21 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Advocates of board reform argue that outsider‑dominated boards more actively promote firm financial performance, yet this study uniquely examines the board composition–performance relationship in three respects. The study seeks to assess how risk‑adjusted market returns relate to outside director representation on boards. The authors analyze risk‑adjusted market returns and board composition, extending the model to include the firm’s dividend decision. The study finds that outside director representation directly improves corporate financial performance and influences dividend policy.

Abstract

Advocates of board of director reform suggest that outsider dominated boards take a more active role in promoting the financial performance of the firm. Although a number of studies have examined the board composition/financial performance relationship, this study is unique in three respects. It adds risk-adjusted market return as a performance variable in board composition/financial performance studies and finds a direct relationship between outside directors representation on the board and corporate financial performance. Finally, the analysis is extended to incorporate the dividend decision of the firm. The findings provide evidence that board composition affects dividend policy.

References

21