The Journal of Politics · 2002 · 988 citations · 36 references
Social SciencesPolitical ScienceSocial PsychologyDecision TheoryPolitical BehaviorSocial CognitionAffective Decision MakingBiasCandidate EvaluationElectionsElectoral BehaviorVoting BehaviorAffectBiasesDecision BiasesHuman Information ProcessingPolitical Information ProcessingPolitical Information SeekingSocial Information Processing Theory
Motivated reasoning shows that affectively charged political information processing biases citizens to delay incongruent information and may even increase support for a liked candidate when faced with negative data. The study uses a dynamic information board experiment to test key effects of motivated reasoning. The authors employ a dynamic information board experiment to observe how motivated reasoning shapes information search and decision timing. The experiment confirms that affective biases delay processing of incongruent information, can boost support for liked candidates when negative data is encountered, and result in lower quality decisions, undermining the rational Bayesian voter model.
Researchers attempting to understand how citizens process political information have advanced motivated reasoning to explain the joint role of affect and cognition. The prominence of affect suggests that all social information processing is affectively charged and prone to biases. This article makes use of a unique data set collected using a dynamic information board experiment to test important effects of motivated reasoning. In particular, affective biases should cause citizens to take longer processing information incongruent with their existing affect and such biases should also direct search for new information about candidates. Somewhat perversely, motivated reasoners may actually increase their support of a positively evaluated candidate upon learning new negatively evaluated information. Findings are reported that support all of these expectations. Additional analysis shows that these affective biases may easily lead to lower quality decision making, leading to a direct challenge to the notion of voters as rational Bayesian updaters.
36
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman · Science · 1974 · 28K citations
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman · 1975 · 23.1K citations
The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations.
Theodore M. Newcomb, Fritz Heider · American Sociological Review · 1958 · 12K citations
Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Elizabeth C. Hirschman, Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic et al. · Journal of Marketing Research · 1983 · 3.9K citations