The Political Economy of Clientelism*

James A. Robinson, Thierry Verdier

Scandinavian Journal of Economics · 2013 · 553 citations · 39 references

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TL;DR

Jobs serve as credible, selective, and reversible redistribution tools that link voter welfare to a politician’s success. The paper argues that the political‑commitment problem explains why income redistribution often takes the inefficient form of public‑sector employment. The study finds that incentive‑compatible public‑sector employment creates inefficiencies in public‑good provision, especially under high inequality, low productivity, high political stakes, and when ideology outweighs monetary concerns.

Abstract

Abstract In this paper, we argue that the political‐commitment problem provides an explanation for why much income redistribution takes an inefficient form, particularly employment in the public sector. A job is a credible way of redistributing when it provides rents (such as in situations with moral hazard), and employment is optimal ex post . Moreover, a job is selective and reversible, and thus ties the continuation utility of a voter to the political success of a particular politician. We show that the need to make offers of employment incentive‐compatible leads to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods. We also show that such inefficient redistribution becomes relatively attractive in situations with high inequality and low productivity. Inefficiency is increased when the stakes from politics are high, when inequality is high, and when money matters less than ideology in politics.

References

39