Concepedia

Publication | Closed Access

Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas

693

Citations

19

References

2006

Year

TLDR

The unprecedented losses from Hurricane Katrina can be explained by two paradoxes: the safe‑development paradox, where federal efforts to make hazardous areas safer actually increased potential for catastrophic damage, and the local‑government paradox, where local officials under‑prioritize vulnerability‑reducing policies despite bearing the brunt of suffering and loss. The author argues that, despite these paradoxes, disaster losses can be mitigated if local governments adopt comprehensive hazard‑mitigation plans. The federal government can encourage local commitment by making modest adjustments to the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 and the Flood Insurance Act. The author recommends a major shift of the National Flood Insurance Program from insuring individuals to insuring communities to more reliably reduce disaster losses.

Abstract

The unprecedented losses from Hurricane Katrina can be explained by two paradoxes. The safe development paradox is that in trying to make hazardous areas safer, the federal government in fact substantially increased the potential for catastrophic property damages and economic loss. The local government paradox is that while their citizens bear the brunt of human suffering and financial loss in disasters, local officials pay insufficient attention to policies to limit vulnerability. The author demonstrates in this article that in spite of the two paradoxes, disaster losses can be blunted if local governments prepare comprehensive plans that pay attention to hazard mitigation. The federal government can take steps to increase local government commitment to planning and hazard mitigation by making relatively small adjustments to the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 and the Flood Insurance Act. To be more certain of reducing disaster losses, however, the author suggests that we need a major reorientation of the National Flood Insurance Program from insuring individuals to insuring communities.

References

YearCitations

Page 1