Mind · 1998 · 131 citations · 6 references
Life SciencesBiologyComparative LinguisticsEvolutionary TheoryNature Of ScienceEssentialismEvolutionRules Of OriginOrganismic Essentialism
Origin essentialists such as Salmon and Forbes argue that slight variation in an artifact or organism’s origin is possible, reflecting a key intuition in the debate. This paper examines the case for origin essentialism and finds it wanting. The analysis focuses on Salmon’s and Forbes’s arguments, critiquing Salmon’s reliance on a sufficiency principle for cross‑world identity and Forbes’s use of an overly strong claim that no variation in an organism’s origin is possible. Both arguments fail to respect the intuition that slight variation is possible: Salmon’s sufficiency principle should be rejected, and Forbes’s claim is too strong.
In this paper, I examine the case that has been made for origin essentialism and find it wanting. I focus on the arguments of Nathan Salmon and Graeme Forbes. Like most origin essentialists, Salmon and Forbes have been concerned to respect the intuition that slight variation in the origin of an artifact or organism is possible. But, I argue, both oftheir arguments fail to respect this intuition. Salmon's argument depends on a sufficiency principle for crossworld identity, which should be rejected, if-as Salmon concedes-a given artifact might have been originally made from slightly different material. Similarly, Forbes's argument succeeds only if essentially the same argument can be used to establish a claim that-by his own admission-is too strong, namely that no variation, however slight, in an organism's origin is possible.
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Paul Coppock, Nathan Salmón · The Journal of Philosophy · 1984 · 345 citations
James E. Tomberlin, David Lewis · Noûs · 1989 · 180 citations
Humanities, Philosophy, Metaphysics +11
Colin McGinn · The Journal of Philosophy · 1976 · 105 citations
Richard L. Cartwright · The Journal of Philosophy · 1968 · 99 citations
Graeme Forbes · Philosophical Studies · 1980 · 98 citations