World Politics · 2011 · 474 citations · 55 references
Social SciencesPolitical ScienceEthnic ConflictPolitical SociologyPolitical ViolenceAfrican PoliticsConflict In AfricaEthnic InsurgenciesPolitical PowerPost-conflict Ethnic RelationsCivil War LegaciesCoercive ApparatusCoercive InstitutionsCoup RiskRebel CoercionRebel Collective ActionRegional Conflict Dynamics
In sub‑Saharan Africa, personalist regimes face a commitment problem that drives elites to eliminate rivals through ethnic exclusion, a strategy that protects their power but raises the risk of civil war. The study investigates why rulers use ethnic exclusion despite the heightened risk of civil war. The author tests the hypothesis using the Ethnic Power Relations dataset and original data on coup conspirators’ ethnicities in Africa. The analysis shows that ethnic exclusion in Africa reduces coup risk but increases civil‑war risk, with purged coconspirators and their coethnics being sixteen times more likely to rebel within three years of exclusion.
Why do rulers employ ethnic exclusion at the risk of civil war? Focusing on the region of sub-Saharan Africa, the author attributes this costly strategy to the commitment problem that arises in personalist regimes between elites who hold joint control of the state's coercive apparatus. As no faction can be sure that others will not exploit their violent capabilities to usurp power, elites maneuver to protect their privileged position and safeguard against others' first-a rising internal threat, rulers move to eliminate their rivals to guarantee their personal and political survival. But the cost of such a strategy, especially when carried out along ethnic lines, is that it increases the risk of a future civil war. To test this argument, the author employs the Ethnic Power Relations data set combined with original data on the ethnicity of conspirators of coups and rebellions in Africa. He finds that in Africa ethnic exclusion substitutes civil war risk for coup risk. And rulers are significantly more likely to exclude their coconspirators —the very friends and allies who helped them come to power—than other included groups, but at the cost of increasing the risk of a future civil war with their former allies. In the first three years after being purged from the central government, coconspirators and their coethnics are sixteen times more likely to rebel than when they were represented at the apex of the regime.
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