The Soviet Strategic Culture. Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations.

TLDR

The report identifies historical, institutional, and political factors that shape a uniquely Soviet strategic culture, noting that evidence is ambiguous, doctrines may evolve slowly, and situational constraints also influence behavior. The study examines American doctrines of limited nuclear war and intrawar deterrence in the context of Soviet doctrinal tradition, emphasizing three caveats. The authors argue that American doctrines of limited nuclear war conflict with deeply-rooted Soviet beliefs, implying Soviet decision-makers may not adhere to American notions of mutual restraint in target and weapon selection. Author: (Author).

Abstract

Abstract : The report identifies several factors--historical, institutional, and political--that have given rise to a uniquely Soviet approach to strategic thought. American doctrines of limited nuclear war and intrawar deterrence are examined in light of this Soviet doctrinal tradition. It is argued that such doctrines conflict with deeply-rooted Soviet beliefs; hence, Soviet decisionmakers may not abide by American notions of mutual restraint in the choice of targets and weapons. Three caveats are stressed, however. First, evidence on Soviet strategic doctrine is ambiguous. Two, even deeply-rooted doctrinal beliefs may change, albeit slowly, in response to technical or other environmental changes. Three, doctrinal preference is not the only important factor that might affect Soviet behavior in a nuclear crisis. Situational temptations and constraints may carry independent weight. (Author)