British Journal of Political Science · 2001 · 178 citations · 17 references
Public AffairsPolitical SciencePublic PolicyLegislative ProcedureLegislative ProcessParliamentary ProcedureEuropean IntegrationEuropean LawEuropean PoliticsEuropean Union InstitutionsLegislative Decision-makingVeto ProcedureEuropean Union Legislative PoliticsEuropean Union Policy-makingEuropean Union PoliticsLegislative Amendment ProcessesLegislative History EvidenceLegislative History InterpretationRevisionist Strategy
The article analyses the role of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council in the two main legislative procedures in the European Union: co-operation and co-decision (I). We use the legislative history of some 5,000 parliamentary amendments. These procedures have been the subject of a great deal of theoretical debate. According to conventional wisdom the co-decision procedure increases the powers of the European Parliament. Revisionist approaches, however, suggest that the conditional agenda-setting powers accorded to the Parliament by the co-operation procedure are more important than the veto powers ascribed by co-decision.
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