On the Universality of Social Psychological Theories

Abstract

As prescribed by the culture of natural science, theories of social psychology are essentially intraindividual mechanisms or information-processing structures that, when activated by stimulus conditions, determine cognitive and behavioral responses. Such theories are conceived to operate independently of the sociocultural context in which people exist. We argue that without being connected to the biology of the organism, or to features of the ecology or social structure that are common to humankind, there is no a priori basis for assuming such theories to be universal. Further, for theories to be universal, the meaning of the stimulus conditions has to be constant across cultures, but since culture is the ultimate source of meaning, we cannot take meaning constancy for granted. On the other hand, cross-cultural variations in social behavior may be "surface" expressions of deep structure norms that are universal. Finally, we examine universalistic conceptual frameworks and models, which provide dimensions along which cultural comparisons can be made, to suggest and test general hypotheses.