Interdicting a Nuclear-Weapons Project

TLDR

A proliferator aims to rapidly produce a first small batch of fission weapons, while an interdictor seeks to delay that completion. The study develops a max‑min model to identify resource‑limited interdiction actions that maximally delay a proliferator’s weapons project, accounting for the proliferator’s adaptive response. The model integrates a critical‑path project‑management submodel, is solved in minutes on a personal computer using off‑the‑shelf software that manages the database, controls optimization, displays results, and analyzes a published case study of three uranium‑enrichment technologies. Cascade loading is an inherent fragility across all technologies, and the analysis provides policymakers with quantitative insights into the effects of various interdiction options.

Abstract

A “proliferator” seeks to complete a first small batch of fission weapons as quickly as possible, whereas an “interdictor” wishes to delay that completion for as long as possible. We develop and solve a max-min model that identifies resource-limited interdiction actions that maximally delay completion time of the proliferator's weapons project, given that the proliferator will observe any such actions and adjust his plans to minimize that time. The model incorporates a detailed project-management (critical path method) submodel, and standard optimization software solves the model in a few minutes on a personal computer. We exploit off-the-shelf project-management software to manage a database, control the optimization, and display results. Using a range of levels for interdiction effort, we analyze a published case study that models three alternate uranium-enrichment technologies. The task of “cascade loading” appears in all technologies and turns out to be an inherent fragility for the proliferator at all levels of interdiction effort. Such insights enable policy makers to quantify the effects of interdiction options at their disposal, be they diplomatic, economic, or military.