Presentism and Relativity

Abstract

In this critical notice we argue against William Craig's recent attempt to reconcile presentism (roughly, the view that only the present is real) with relativity theory. Craig's defense of his position boils down to endorsing a ‘neo‐Lorentzian interpretation’ of special relativity. We contend that his reconstruction of Lorentz's theory and its historical development is fatally flawed and that his arguments for reviving this theory fail on many counts. 1Rival theories of time 2Relativity and the present 3Special relativity: one theory, three interpretations 4Theories of principle and constructive theories 5The relativity interpretation: explanatorily deficient? 6The relativity interpretation: ontologically fragmented? 7The space‐time interpretation: does God need a preferred frame of reference? 8The neo‐Lorentzian interpretation: at what price? 9The neo‐Lorentzian interpretation: with what payoff? 10Why we should prefer the space‐time interpretation over the neo‐Lorentzian interpretation 11What about general relativity? 12Squaring the tenseless space‐time interpretation with our tensed experience