Ether

Artem Dinaburg, Monirul Sharif, Wenke Lee

2008 · 661 citations · 24 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Malware is a leading internet security threat, and malware analysis extracts runtime behavior to supply signatures and evidence, yet current analyzers embedded in the guest OS are easily detected and evaded. This paper seeks to develop a transparent, external malware analyzer that remains hidden from malware during runtime. Ether achieves this by leveraging Intel VT virtualization extensions to run entirely outside the target OS, eliminating in‑guest components. Because Ether has no in‑guest software, it cannot be detected by malware and avoids the shortcomings of incomplete or inaccurate system modeling.

Abstract

Malware has become the centerpiece of most security threats on the Internet. Malware analysis is an essential technology that extracts the runtime behavior of malware, and supplies signatures to detection systems and provides evidence for recovery and cleanup. The focal point in the malware analysis battle is how to detect versus how to hide a malware analyzer from malware during runtime. State-of-the-art analyzers reside in or emulate part of the guest operating system and its underlying hardware, making them easy to detect and evade. In this paper, we propose a transparent and external approach to malware analysis, which is motivated by the intuition that for a malware analyzer to be transparent, it must not induce any side-effects that are unconditionally detectable by malware. Our analyzer, Ether, is based on a novel application of hardware virtualization extensions such as Intel VT, and resides completely outside of the target OS environment. Thus, there are no in-guest software components vulnerable to detection, and there are no shortcomings that arise from incomplete or inaccurate system

References

24