Proscriptive versus prescriptive morality: Two faces of moral regulation.

TLDR

The study distinguishes prescriptive morality, which is activation‑based and focuses on positive outcomes, from proscriptive morality, which is inhibition‑based and focuses on negative outcomes. The authors examine the implications of these two moral orientations for broader social regulation, including cross‑cultural differences and political orientation. Across seven studies, the two moral faces were shown to be distinct yet equally weighted, with proscriptive morality perceived as concrete, mandatory, and blame‑inducing, while prescriptive morality was seen as abstract, discretionary, and credit‑giving.

Abstract

A distinction is made between two forms of morality on the basis of approach-avoidance differences in self-regulation. Prescriptive morality is sensitive to positive outcomes, activation-based, and focused on what we should do. Proscriptive morality is sensitive to negative outcomes, inhibition-based, and focused on what we should not do. Seven studies profile these two faces of morality, support their distinct motivational underpinnings, and provide evidence of moral asymmetry. Both are well-represented in individuals' moral repertoire and equivalent in terms of moral weight, but proscriptive morality is condemnatory and strict, whereas prescriptive morality is commendatory and not strict. More specifically, in these studies proscriptive morality was perceived as concrete, mandatory, and duty-based, whereas prescriptive morality was perceived as more abstract, discretionary, and based in duty or desire; proscriptive immorality resulted in greater blame, whereas prescriptive morality resulted in greater moral credit. Implications for broader social regulation, including cross-cultural differences and political orientation, are discussed.