Journal of Accounting Research · 2002 · 419 citations · 12 references
BusinessAccountancyAccountingCorporate DisclosureCorporate ReportingFinancial AccountingAnnual ReportingDisclosure TheoryEarnings ReportingFinancial ReportingFinancial Reporting TheoryFinancial StatementsDeterminants Of Firm ValueEarnings PredictabilityEarnings SmoothnessFirm Value EffectsSmoothing Of Earnings
The study investigates whether managers can simultaneously employ big bath and earnings smoothing strategies by modeling how investors infer the precision of reported earnings. The authors model financial reporting by letting investors infer the precision of reported earnings. The model finds that larger earnings surprises lower inferred precision and dampen firm value impact, encouraging smoother earnings; managers under‑report earnings maximally for bad news to take a big bath, smooth earnings for good news with smoothing tied to cashflows, and adjust reporting from over‑ to under‑reporting as news improves, a pattern that persists under both naïve and sophisticated investor beliefs.
We study a model of financial reporting where investors infer the precision of reported earnings. Reporting a larger earnings surprise reduces the inferred earnings precision, dampening the impact on firm value of reporting higher earnings, and providing a natural demand for smoother earnings. We show that for sufficiently “bad” news, the manager under‐reports earnings by the maximum, preferring to take a “big bath” in the current period in order to report higher future earnings. If the news is “good,” the manager smoothes earnings, with the amount of smoothing depending on the level of cashflows observed. He either over‐reports or partially under‐reports for slightly good news, and gradually increases his under‐reporting as the news gets better, until he is under‐reporting the maximum amount for sufficiently good news. This result holds both when investors are “naïve” and ignore management’s ability to manipulate earnings, or “sophisticated” and correctly infer management’s disclosure strategy.
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An Explanation for Accounting Income Smoothing
Brett Trueman, Sheridan Titman · Journal of Accounting Research · 1988 · 925 citations